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Does Greater Accountability Improve the Quality of  
Delivery of Public Services? Evidence from Uganda 
 
Abstract: While the importance of corruption as a possible impediment to foreign investment in an international context is 
now well realized, it is not clear to what extent corruption affects, either directly through bribe-taking or indirectly through 
inadequate quality of public services, the level of economic activity by domestic entrepreneurs. Using a large survey from 
Uganda, we show that domestic and foreign entrepreneurs, government officials, and households are unanimous in 
highlighting the pervasiveness and importance of corruption. Efforts to establish institutions to deal with corrupt practices 
have not been matched by public education on the proper procedures. The fact that such lack of knowledge on procedures to 
report corruption increases households’ risk of being subject to bribery and significantly reduces the quality of public service 
delivery leads us to conclude that improved accountability will be important to reduce the incidence of corruption and 
improve delivery of public services.  
 
1. Introduction  
Higher levels of economic integration across countries and greater availability of information provide 
significant potential for efficiency gains, but have also helped to expose corruption. Corruption is defined 
as the abuse of public power for private benefit, and is a key constraint to efficient allocation of 
economically valuable resources, effective provision of public goods and services, and people’s 
confidence in the state and the legal system. High levels of accountability, defined as a system of open 
and transparent controls, can help to improve economic efficiency and reduce the scope for discretionary 
action by public officials. Regulations are critical for the development process in at least two ways.  
First, it is widely held that a significant part of the growth that is expected to reduce poverty in developing 
countries has to come from private investment. Rent seeking by partial and corrupt officials, however, 
increases the costs associated with entrepreneurial investment and may lead foreign investors to take their 
business elsewhere. Corruption also forces domestic entrepreneurs to go underground, leading to high 
levels of informality and a narrow tax base. Complaints about lack of transparency, high levels of 
regulatory intervention and corruption, and the cost that these impose on doing business are at the core of 
recent empirical evidence gathered from entrepreneurs in the Global Investment Climate Survey.  
A second reason is that developing countries require significant investment in public goods, such as 
infrastructure, education, and health, to attract private investment and create a broad-based and egalitarian 
economic development. However, high levels of corruption have been shown to bias public spending in 
undesirable directions and reduce the quality of provision of such services. Unless non-corrupt and 
transparent mechanisms to allocate public funds are available and officials are accountable for the 
allocation, their full economic potential may not be realized. The harmful and potentially far-reaching 
importance of corruption, as well as the fact that high levels of economic growth do not necessarily lead 
to a reduction of corrupt practices, is now widely recognized. As a consequence, the issue has moved up 
on the agenda of international institutions and institutional reforms to combat corruption, including anti-
corruption commissions, in many countries.    2
This paper uses the case of Uganda to explore three issues in more detail. First, we are interested in the 
prevalence and incidence of corruption across different government departments as assessed by the 
private and the public sector, and the extent of knowledge on how to respond to corruption and hold 
officials accountable. Second, we are interested in factors that affect the extent to which households are 
exposed to bribery, hypothesizing in particular that greater ability to hold officials accountable will 
decrease the likelihood of such bribery. Finally, we expect that such accountability will affect not only 
corruption but also the quality with which public services will be provided.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section two links the topic to the broader literature and discusses the 
conceptual framework as well as the strategy to implement econometric tests using the data at hand. 
Section three describes the data from Uganda’s second integrity survey and uses them to provide 
descriptive evidence on the incidence of corruption across institutions, households’ exposure to corrupt 
practices and their knowledge of procedures to report corruption, and the quality of public service 
delivery. Section four provides econometric evidence to identify the impact of greater accountability on 
the incidence of bribe taking and the quality of public service delivery. Section five concludes by 
summarizing the evidence and translating it into a number of recommendations for policy.  
2. Conceptual model and relation to the literature  
Issues of governance have long been one of the neglected areas in development economics (Bardhan 
2000). Recently, however, there has been increasing interest in quantifying the levels of corruption, 
transparency, and accountability across countries to improve understanding of their impact and identify 
measures that can help to reduce undesirable consequences. This has brought to the fore the fact that 
corruption is widespread and constitutes an important obstacle to economic growth, in particular through 
its impact on the nature and quality of spending on public service provision and the investment decisions 
by foreign and domestic private entrepreneurs that, in return, will affect the size of a country’s tax base. 
As developing countries share many characteristics that make them particularly prone to high levels of 
corruption, a consensus that actions to improve governance would be warranted and needed in addition to 
growth-enhancing policies is now emerging among international financial institutions. While this has 
resulted in the establishment of institutions that can help combat corruption, less attention has been 
devoted to the need to also enhance accountability in order to make these institutions work. To illustrate 
this point and provide a basis for subsequent empirical investigation, we develop a very simple model of 
the way in which greater accountability affects the incidence of corruption and the quality of public 
service delivery and discuss how this can be implemented econometrically using data from Uganda’s 
second integrity survey.  
2.1 Insights from the literature    3
Thanks in part to more widespread availability of information, higher levels of economic integration and 
the associated greater emphasis on competitiveness and efficiency, and the reduction of ideological 
barriers, interest in corruption and governance has been surging in recent years (Bardhan 1997, Tanzi 
1998), coinciding with greater awareness of the importance of institutions in the process of development 
(Nugent and Robinson 2002, Acemoglu 2003). As private investment is likely to be a key determinant of 
growth in most developing countries (Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles 2003), a conjunction of institutional 
features that have been commonly lumped together under the heading “investment climate” becomes of 
critical importance In fact, based in most instances on assessments by outside investors or local experts, 
cross-country indicators to assess various aspects of this phenomenon, compare them, and measure their 
impact have been developed by academics (Feld and Voigt 2003), independent institutions such 
Transparency International (Eigen 2002) and the World Bank (Djankov 2002, Batra et al. 2003).  
Descriptive evidence based on these efforts highlights that a combination of high taxes, arbitrary 
regulations, policy uncertainty, and low quality of public service delivery and ill-developed financial 
markets are universally perceived as key constraints to business development. These phenomena are not 
independent of each other but can in many cases be traced to high levels of corruption that significantly 
reduce the scope for economic growth and development. This is confirmed by a large number of cross-
country econometric studies that have used indices of different aspects of the phenomenon to demonstrate 
the harmful impact of corruption on aggregate growth through a variety of mechanisms (Mauro 1995, 
Bardhan 1997, Tanzi 2000, Mo 2001, Rivera-Batiz 2002, Feld and Voigt 2003). Although more limited, 
evidence from within country studies supports these results (Gomez and Gallon 2002, Fisman and Gatti 
2002b). Two main channels through which such an effect comes about are the type of public services 
provided and the efficiency of their provision and the level of investment by private entrepreneurs.  
A first channel through which corruption affects economic growth is by affecting the composition of 
public spending and the quality of public service provision. It has long been known that large investment 
projects provide greater opportunities for government bureaucrats to obtain kick-backs than spending on 
education and health projects or on operation and maintenance. Indeed, empirical evidence demonstrates 
that countries with high levels of corruption spend too little on education and health (and on operation and 
maintenance of past investment) (Mauro 1998), thereby resulting in a significant reduction in the 
productivity of public investment in countries where, partly due to high cost of raising public revenue, 
domestic resource mobilization is already insufficient (Ades and Di Tella 1997). This will make it harder 
for government to fulfill its most important role, to provide public goods (including the enforcement of 
contracts and protection of property rights), and to impose regulatory controls as a response to market 
failures. In addition to reducing economic growth, the quality of public service delivery, and foreign 
investment, this can, in the extreme, lead to a significant reduction in the legitimacy of the state (Tanzi   4
1998). The lack of publicly provided infrastructure capital, in turn, has been shown to constitute an 
important bottleneck for the development of private firms (Reinikka and Svensson 2002) which, through 
creation of unnecessary barriers to entry, reduces competition and innovation by small start-up firms 
(May et al. 2002, Broadman and Recanatini 2002). In fact, this could well be one of the reasons that 
infrastructure investment improves economic growth only if associated with the right governance 
environment (Esfahani and Ramirez 2003).  
In addition to this indirect effect via the level of public provision, corruption also has a more direct impact 
on the level of economic activity because the need to pay a random bribe in order to get things done (or 
even to protect a business from looting) distorts incentives and acts as an arbitrary and unpredictable tax 
that adds significantly to the cost of doing business in a country. There is strong evidence that levels of 
foreign direct investment are much higher in countries where individual freedom and respect for civil and 
property rights is high (Harms and Ursprung 2002). The corruption-induced increase in the transaction 
cost for private business has often prompted foreign investment to either enter into specific types of joint 
ventures or to move to other countries (Smarzynska and Wei 2001). Domestic firms are likely to move 
abroad to escape the net of regulations which many countries require to register a business (Djankov 
2002), or in order to escape the demands of a corrupt bureaucracy and a weak legal system, they often 
join the informal economy, thereby further reducing the potential for generation of government revenue, 
provision of public goods, and economic development (Friedman et al. 2000).  
The issue of corruption is particularly relevant in the context of economic development because 
developing countries share many of the characteristics that make them particularly prone to corruption 
(Tanzi 1998). These include a plethora of regulatory interventions, regimes of taxation that are 
comparatively high but contain many loopholes, non-transparent procedures, high levels of discretionary 
government spending, limited scope for own revenue generation by local governments (Fisman and Gatti 
2002a) and bureaucrats’ ability to award large rents (e.g. from natural resources and public lands or 
licenses) in a discretionary manner. These tendencies are exacerbated by low quality of the bureaucracy 
and public sector wages (Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001), limited ability to impose administrative 
controls, and non-transparent rules, laws, and processes. High barriers to new business entry and soft 
budget constraints on incumbents are particularly important institutional factors that provide an 
opportunity for corruption. In fact, disproportionate dependence on aid transfers has been shown to reduce 
accountability and thus the quality of governance (Knack 2001). As long as the political economy of aid 
was dominated by the demands of the cold war environment, few donors seem to have paid attention to 
this issue (Alesina and Weder 2002), but this seems to be gradually changing with international financial 
institutions as well as bilaterals increasingly aware of the importance of good governance as a 
precondition to make aid achieve its desired objectives (Burnside and Dollar 2000). To address this,   5
donors have in many countries (including Uganda) supported the establishment of institutions to deal 
specifically with issues of corruption. However, little is known about the extent to which such institutions 
have been effective or the extent to which increased levels of accountability would help improve their 
effectiveness, as would be suggested by a number of recent studies that have pointed to an important role 
of the mass media to put policy making on a more informed basis (Stromberg 2001, Besley and Burgess 
2002) and demands to bring in new actors such as NGOs and to foster transparency and open debate as a 
means to expose corrupt practices (Merhotra 2002, Goetz and Jenkins 2002, Ebrahim 2003).  
Uganda provides an interesting case to study this issue. Despite high levels of economic growth since the 
early 1990s, the country has ranked continuously in the bottom part of Transparency International’s 
corruption perception index.
1 Low levels of transparency and accountability have been identified as 
potential obstacles to continued progress in reducing poverty (Francis and James 2003). The goal of 
reducing corruption features prominently in the country’s development strategy and an Inspector General 
of Government (IGG) and a Ministry of Ethics and Integrity have been set up to help put this into 
practice. In addition, the Leadership Code Act of 2002 provides for minimum standards of behavior and 
conduct by leaders serving in public offices (including government departments and statutory bodies) and 
for an enforcement mechanism through the IGG’s office. It requires leaders to declare there incomes, 
assets and liabilities at the time of assumption of office and thereafter every two years (Republic of 
Uganda, 2002a). Thus the country provides a good example to derive lessons on the incidence of 
corruption, the potential importance of good governance for service delivery, and the effectiveness of 
mechanisms to improve governance and accountability.  
2.2 Conceptual model  
Assume that a public administrator receives exogenously given transfers (e.g. from central government) 
of size Mp to provide public goods and at the same time has to approve private investments of size Mq. 
The monetary benefit to the administrator from investing x in public goods or from an investment of x by 
the private sector is given by the functions bp(x) for public and bq(x) for private investment, respectively. 
We assume that these functions are well-behaved (i.e. b’(x) > 0, b’’(x) < 0 and b(x)<x for any x).
2 In each 
case, the administrator has the possibility of diverting a share li < 1 (i=p, q) of the money involved to own 
use. This money can be kept if the looting is not detected but an amount di(lix) with d’(x) > 0, d’’(x)> 0 
and d(x)>x has to be repaid if diversion of x is detected. The probability of being detected is p(a,I) which 
has as its functions the level of accountability a and the institutional framework I and which is concave in 
both its arguments. The problem of the administrator is then to choose li (i=p,q) to maximize  
                                                 
1 While the expansion in the number of countries in the corruption perception index compiled by Transparency International makes a consistent 
assessment more difficult, Uganda ranked as 43
rd out of 51 countries in 1996 (the first year when the country was included), 74
th of 85 in 1998, 
80
th out of 90 in 2000, and 113
th out of 133 in 2003.  
2 The latter just implies that the monetary benefit will not be greater than the amount invested.    6
bi[Mi(1-li)]+ Mili – p(a,I)d(Mili)   (1) 
Solving this problem will yield equilibrium levels of “theft” or corruption l
*
i (Mi, a, I);  i=p,q. It is 
intuitive and easy to show that, for any given Mi,, the derivatives of l
*
i with respect to its second and third 
element are non-positive. In other words, since for any interior solution, the administrator will embezzle 
funds up to the point where the expected loss from being caught equals the marginal benefit from the 
investment, any improvement in accountability or institutional quality will reduce the level of 
embezzlement and thereby automatically increase the amount of money that is spent in productive public 
or private investment. The implication from the model, and the central hypothesis to be tested empirically 
below is that, within any given institutional setup, higher levels of accountability will be associated with 
public servants being less likely to demand bribes from the private sector and, in the public sector, have 
greater incentives to not only demand less fees for their services but also deliver them more effectively.  
2.3 Empirical implementation and estimation strategy  
As our data contain information on bribe taking as well as a subjective assessment of changes in the 
quality of public service delivery, the key issue to be confronted before being able to proceed to 
estimation is to find an empirical correspondence for accountability and institutional quality (a and I in 
equation 1). As to the institutional framework, we assume that the only source of variation in institutional 
quality is across sectors, implying that we can use sectoral dummies to absorb differences in this variable. 
As a measure of accountability, we use the share of households who indicate to know where and how to 
report cases of corruption, something that can be justified in a situation where, as in the case of Uganda, 
an explicit anti-corruption policy exists and institutions to enforce this policy have been established, but 
very few households actually know how to make use of these institutions.  
One econometric issue that arises in this context is that those who are more likely to be subject to corrupt 
practices or who have been hurt by corruption in the past and those for whom such knowledge is more 
easy to acquire will be more likely to make the investment needed to find out how to report corruption. 
This implies that knowledge of ways to report corruption is not exogenous and that, in order to obtain an 
unbiased estimate, instrumentation will be needed. The level of education will make it easier to acquire 
information on how to report corruption but is extremely unlikely to directly affect the probability of 
being affected by corruption and can therefore be used as an identifying instrument (Greene 1995). If the 
knowledge on corruption were measured as a continuous dependent variable, standard two-stage least 
squares could be used to deal with this problem. In cases with a limited dependent variable, using the 
predicted value from a first-stage probit regression does produce unbiased results (Angrist 1991). We 
therefore first estimate a probit equation for households’ knowledge on how to report corruption  
Ki = α1 +α2 Xi + µi        (2)   7
where Ki is an indicator for whether or not the household reported to know the procedures for reporting 
corruption, Xi is a vector of household characteristics, and µi is an iid error term. In particular, Xi includes 
the head’s educational qualification, the household’s level of consumption expenditure and wealth (as 
proxied by dummies for ownership of the house, a bicycle, or a motorized vehicle) as well as the mean 
expenditure in the village, the sector of main economic activity, a dummy for rural areas and regional 
dummies. We expect that higher levels of education and asset ownership and employment in formal 
sectors of the economy will all increase a households’ likelihood of knowing the necessary procedures 
and use the predicted value as one of the right hand side variables in subsequent regressions that aim to 
test the impact of accountability (as proxied by this variable) on the incidence of bribe-taking and the 
quality of public service delivery.  
Determinants of bribery: As the survey at hand provides a direct measure of whether or not a household 
who, during the last 6 months had approached a specific institution, was required to pay a bribe as well as 
the amount that needed to be paid, we can estimate an equation of the form  
Bi = α1 +α2 K
^
i +α3 Zi + µi        (3) 
where Bi is an indicator of whether or not a bribe had to be paid, K
^
i is the predicted value from regression 
(2) as discussed above, Zi is equal to the vector Xi as defined above with the exception that educational 
attainment is not included, and µi is again an iid error term. Based on the conceptual discussion, we expect 
α2, the coefficient on our measure of accountability, to be negative and highly significant. To assess 
whether there are externalities from knowledge at the village level we also include the level of predicted 
knowledge at the village level.  
Quality of public services: There are two reasons to complement the above regression on determinants of 
bribe-taking with information on the quality of public services. One is that the former regressions could 
suffer from selectivity bias to the extent that certain households may not even approach government 
institutions because they expect not to be attended or to have to pay bribes. A second one is that, higher 
levels of accountability might have an independent impact on public servants’ motivation to provide 
services in an effective manner. As the quality of public services will be affected by many factors (e.g. the 
pre-existing level of infrastructure, staffing levels, etc.) that are not available in our data, we complement 
the analysis of the level of satisfaction with an assessment of changes in the perceived quality of service 
delivery. As is well known in the literature, use of changes eliminates time-invariant fixed effects and will 
thus produce estimates that are less likely to be affected by bias. Defining Qijk as the (perceived) quality of 
provision of service k by individual i in village j and ∆Qijk as the change in this variable, the equation to be 
estimated is given by  
∆Qik / ∆Qik  = α1 +α2 K
^
i +α3 Cj +α4 Sj +α5 Rj + µi        (4)   8
where K
^
i is the predicted knowledge of reporting procedures as defined earlier, Cj and Sj are the mean 
levels of corruption and expenditure, and Rj is a vector of regional dummies, all for village j.
3 The 
rationale for these variables is straightforward: while we expect households’ knowledge on how to report 
corruption to improve the incentive structure for bureaucrats, higher levels of pre-existing corruption 
would reduce the level of service quality and dampen the impact of better knowledge. At the same time, 
higher levels of village wealth are likely to increase the amount of resources available and thus make 
improvements in service quality more likely. This implies that we expect α2 and α4 to be positive and α3 
to be negative.  
 
3. Data and descriptive evidence  
Uganda’s second national integrity survey provides evidence on perceptions regarding corruption by 
firms and public sector employees which are used to illustrate the importance of the issue. We then 
discuss descriptive statistics from household level data on the extent of bribery, the quality of public 
service delivery, and knowledge of measures to reduce corruption to provide the background for 
subsequent econometric investigation.  
3.1 The Uganda National Integrity Survey  
Our data come from the Second National Integrity Survey which was conducted for the Inspectorate of 
Government in the second half of 2002 to improve the empirical basis for policies and programmes to 
assess the incidence of corruption in different institutions and strengthen accountability and the quality of 
public service provision (Republic of Uganda 2002b). The survey covered 12,190 households in 55 of 
Uganda’s 56 districts that were in existence at the time the sample was drawn. In addition, an institutional 
module was administered to 618 private entrepreneurs as well as 480 public sector representatives.  
The goal of the household survey was to be representative at the district level. In each district, 20% of the 
sub-counties were randomly selected, starting with District Headquarters. Within these, two to three local 
councils (LC1s, the lowest administrative units) and subsequently households were selected randomly. 
The public sector survey was administered in eight districts – two in each of the country’s four regions: 
Central, East, West and North.
4 A list of institutions and their respective representatives was drawn up 
with the goal of interviewing all units responsible for administration of law and order or provision of 
public services at the national, district, or sub-district level. While the non-response by Ministers at the 
national level was substantial, the sample is fairly complete at the district and sub-district level, consisting 
of about 60 interviews for each of the eight districts. For the private sector survey, the database of firms 
                                                 
3 In each of these cases, respondents were asked to assess the level of improvement on a 1-5 scale. Table 8 provides results for the determinants 
of “significant” (top ranking) and “moderate” (second ranking) improvements in each of these sectors. 
4 These are Kampala, Lira, Mbale/Tororo, Mbarara, Arua, Jinja(Lugazi/Kakira), Masaka and Kasese.    9
paying VAT in the same eight districts where the public sector survey was implemented was used as a 
sample frame, even though this is far from being an ideal solution.
5 One implication is that the sample, 
with a total of 623 interviews, is strongly biased towards Kampala where about 60% of the enterprise 
interviews were conducted. A second consequence is that, even though efforts were made to adjust the 
sectoral composition of the sample, the final distribution of interviews by sector is quite different from the 
contribution of different sectors to the country’s GDP.
6 This implies that, at least in geographical terms, 
the private and public sample are likely to be quite complementary to each other and leads us to interpret 
their results jointly in the discussion below.  
3.2 Assessment of corruption by entrepreneurs and public officials  
Compared to households who, if they were not in contact with officials, may not have a good basis for an 
assessment of corruption issues, those included in the public and private sector surveys are all likely to 
have had first hand experience of dealing with the public sector and, in the case of private firms, are likely 
to use this as the basis for economic decisions. We focus on respondents’ perceived level of corruption in 
different government institutions. Table 1 lists, in ascending order, the share of respondents from public 
and private sectors, respectively, who rated a certain government department as “not honest” or “highly 
corrupt”.
7  
The table illustrates that the incidence of perceived corruption varies widely. A significant number of 
institutions, led by the Central Bank, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Office of Ethics and Integrity, 
and the Ministry of Finance, but also including the Parliament, the Ministry of Education, and the 
President’s Office were perceived to have a high level of integrity. The IGG, the Ministry of Health, the 
Privatization Unit, the Immigration Department and courts are perceived to be more susceptible to 
corruption. Finally, institutions perceived to be most corrupt are (in descending order) the traffic police, 
the Uganda Revenue Authority, Tender Boards, the Electoral Commission, the non-traffic part of the 
police, and the Ministry of Defense. This suggests that, while confidence is high in top levels of the 
executive, it is limited for the institutions that are meant to implement decisions and the organs for 
enforcing the law. Comparing columns 1 and 2 of table 1 illustrate that the ranking of institutions’ level of 
corruption is quite consistent between private and public sector respondents; though there are slight 
differences in ratings these rarely affect the ranking of institutions.
8  
                                                 
5 As the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) was still in the process of completing its Census of Business Establishments, it was not possible to 
use the a more comprehensive register of businesses instead, despite the obvious shortcomings of the VAT register. The key issue to bear in mind 
in interpreting the results is that, given that the VAT register contains only about 6000 firms, compared to 160,000 expected to be included in the 
list of establishments maintained by UBOS, this biases the sample in favor of larger and more formal firms, most of which have more than 5 
employees. 
6 In the final sample, 13% of the establishments are from agriculture, 16% from manufacturing, 56% from services, 12% from construction, and 
3% from other sectors (including mining).  
7 Respondents were asked to rank corruptability of different public institutions on a scale of 1-3 and, for each institution, did have the option of 
not responding (i.e. do not have an opinion”).  
8 Column 4 marks cases where the difference between the private and the public sector’s assessment is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The main difference between public and private responses is that public sector employees identify the ministries of finance and works, as well as   10
To gain an idea of the perceived severity of corruption, respondents were asked to assess the presence of 
five increasingly severe forms of corruption, namely favoritism, bribery, embezzlement, extortion, and 
fraud in the typical government department.
9 Results, separately for the public and private sector, as well 
as for different types of private entrepreneurs, are presented in table 2. This confirms that, even though 
more severe forms of corruption are perceived to be less common, the overall level of confidence in 
public institutions is quite low: more than three quarters of the respondents believe that favoritism, 
bribery, and embezzlement are fairly common, prevalent, or very prevalent while 56% do so for fraud and 
42% for extortion. The picture does not change too much if one focuses only on those who rank different 
phenomena as either prevalent or very prevalent: 61% believe that favoritism is prevalent, 50% do so for 
bribery and embezzlement and 28% and 18%, respectively, believe that fraud and extortion are prevalent.  
While one would expect public employees to assess the quality of public institutions more favorably than 
respondents from the private sector, differences between the two are less pronounced than one would 
think, echoing other studies in Africa (Goldsmith 2003): Bribery is more of a concern to foreign and local 
corporations than the rest. By comparison, foreign (but not local) corporations complain less about 
embezzlement and extortion. While favoritism seems to be a complaint particularly of local corporations, 
there are no systematic differences in the ranking of fraud across different parts of the private sector.  
3.3 Households’ experience with corruption and public service provision 
Household level data allow us to complement the above ranking with measures of incidence and impact 
of corruption on the broader population. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the sample which, in 
view of the forced inclusion of district headquarters, is somewhat biased towards urban households.
10 
This can be illustrated by comparing the results to what is obtained in the nationally representative 
Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS). We find that 15% of households, as compared to about 
25% nationally, are female headed and that only 59%, as compared to about 80% in a national sample, are 
rural. The income gap between rural and urban areas is illustrated by the fact that 73% of the bottom 
quintile are from rural areas, compared to 44% in the top quintile. As to economic sectors, one-third of 
the sample households (49% in the bottom and 21% in the top quintile) are headed by individuals whose 
main source of income is the agricultural sector, 21% by traders, and about another third by professionals 
and craftspeople.  
                                                                                                                                                             
parliament and the courts, as more corruptible than respondents from the private sector. The latter, by contrast, have less confidence in the 
integrity of the President’s Office, the IGG and the NSSF, as well as the privatization office, the ministry of defense, the immigration department, 
the URA, and the traffic police. 
9 Corruption in general is defined as the use of public power for private gain. In this context, favoritism implies that benefits are obtained through 
personal relations between those with power and those seeking favors (jobs, land, or other property), bribery as the demand for payment for 
services that should be freely given, embezzlement as the diversion of public property/money for private use, extortion as the demand for money, 
services or other gains with threats, and fraud as the use of explicitly illegal methods to obtain such private gain. Respondents were asked to 
assess the presence of the different forms of corruption in government on a 1-5 scale where 1 implies non-existent, 2 very limited, 3 fiarly 
common, 4 prevalent, 5 very prevalent.  
10 Despite repeated requests, we were unable to obtain weights that would have allowed to generate nationally representative figures.   11
Our indicator for incidence of corruption is whether, upon personally contacting a particular institution, a 
household was forced to pay a bribe for services that should have been delivered for free. The top panel of 
table 4 provides descriptive evidence for the aggregate and by expenditure quintile.
11 Not surprisingly, the 
share of households who have done so varies: Panel 1 illustrates that about two thirds reported to have 
approached a health institution, about 44% and 40% education or local administration, respectively, and 
about 22% the police and institutions charged with providing productive services. Poorer households had 
generally less contact with the institutions of concern.
12 As this may result in selectivity bias, we 
complement analysis of these households’ actual experience of bribery with the perceived satisfaction 
with service provision by all households in the sample as discussed in more detail below.  
Panels 2 and 3 illustrate that the evidence on corruption is broadly consistent with the ranking of different 
institutions in the institutional part of the survey: Education emerges as the least corrupt with only 7% of 
users having had to pay bribes, followed by local administration (15%), health (21%), and productive 
services (26%).
13 The police emerge as the country’s most corrupt institution - 36% of the households 
who had contact with them reported that they had to pay a bribe. The median bribe paid varies from USh 
3,000 for administrative services to 15,000 for the police.
14 In most cases the share of poor users who had 
to pay bribes was below average and the amount of bribe paid by them less than for the rich, consistent 
with some wealth-differentiated access and the finding that administrators discriminate among clients to 
extract maximum revenue (Svensson 2003).  
Rankings of departments in terms of users satisfaction with the services provided, as reported in the 
second part of the table, suggest that users of health, education, and local administration are most content 
(6.8, 7.6 and 7.2% “highly” satisfied and 29.1, 38.6, and 24.6% “somewhat satisfied”). By comparison, 
only 1.8% and 3.3% of the population are “highly” and 9.4 and 12.7% “somewhat” satisfied with police 
and productive services, respectively. The variation in assessment of institutional quality over the income 
distribution is more marked than in the case of bribe-paying. For example, less than 2% of the bottom two 
quintiles are highly satisfied, as compared to 6.4% in the top quintile. Thus, contrary to what one would 
expect given lower demand for bribes from low-income groups, the poor are consistently less satisfied 
with the quality of service provision than are the rich, even though the latter pay more bribes. This could 
imply that many of the poor may not even try to access services because they expect not to be attended or 
not able to pay the fees needed and that looking at actual bribe payments will thus not be sufficient.
15  
                                                 
11 Here and below, we distinguish education, health, the police, local administration, and institutions to provide productive services (including 
those under the ministries of economy, agriculture, water, forestry, and land). 
12 At least in the case of education, this does not mean that they did not use the services under concern.  
13 Survey data indicate that the abolition of user fees in the health sector with effect from March 2001 has been implemented in a relatively 
effective way, resulting in a significant reduction of the households who reported to have had to pay such fees in the 2002/03 National Household 
Survey (Deininger and Mpuga, 2004). Unfortunately we do not have data on the incidence of bribe taking before this policy change. The fact that 
about one fifth of those who used health services reported having to make some (unofficial) payment suggests that, even though governance 
remains an issue, concerns that the abolition of user fees would cause officials to demand side payments rather than official fees were unfounded.  
14 1 US$ is equivalent to about 1,800 USh and that the average daily wage in agriculture is about USh 2,000.  
15 Future surveys of this type will therefore need to pay more attention to selectivity issues.   12
Given that there are many factors (e.g. levels of staffing and pre-existing infrastructure) that would affect 
the quality of service provision but on which we do not have data, econometric analysis might produce 
biased estimates. Some of these problems can be avoided by looking at changes rather than levels in the 
quality of service provision. Information on such changes over the last 4 years is available only for 
education and health. The pen-ultimate panel of table 4 illustrates that about 11% and 44% of households 
thought that teaching had improved or somewhat, respectively, as compared to 17% and 52% who believe 
the same for school buildings, 12% and 48% for education facilities (i.e. books and other materials), and 
8.5 and 48%, respectively for health services.  
The bottom panel of table 4 highlights that, despite a relatively high prevalence of corruption, few of the 
incidents are actually reported and knowledge about how to do so remains limited. Compared to nearly 
one third of households who reported to have paid at least one bribe during the last 6 months, only 4.5% 
indicate that they ever reported an incident of corruption. More importantly, about 40% of the sample 
know of corruption cases that they failed to report. According to the survey, the single most important 
reason for not doing so is lack of knowledge on the necessary procedures (40%), followed by other 
reasons (28%), households being afraid to offend others (19%), and reporting not being worth the bother 
(13%). This suggests that the large majority of corruption cases in Uganda go unreported -and without 
consequences- not primarily because people fear the social consequences or doubt the effectiveness of 
doing so but because of a lack of knowledge on procedures. The fact that only 21% of the overall 
population (13% in the bottom quintile as compared to 28% in the top quintile) know how to report 
corruption highlights that, in the absence of knowledge on the applicable procedures, establishment of 
national anti-corruption commissions make little difference at the field level. 
Before proceeding towards an empirical assessment of the impact of different institutions on the variables 
of interest, we review responses on the type of institutions perceived to be most helpful in reducing 
corruption. Table 5 suggests that a more intense public discourse and establishment of institutions with a 
mandate to deal effectively with misuse of public office need to go together: while the radio, newspapers, 
church organizations, and local councils, rank among the most important means to help reduce corruption, 
the president’s office, the IGG, and commissions of enquiry are equally important. One clear finding is 
that the police and the judiciary are not in a good position to establish higher standards of conduct but are 
rather part of the problem than a solution. On the other hand, regional differences point towards 
considerable variation across regions; for example in the North where poverty is the highest and the 
presence of other institutions is low, the IGG, church organizations, and the radio are rated as most 
important.  
 
4. Econometric evidence    13
Econometric analysis provides considerable support to the hypothesis that lack of knowledge on how to 
report irregular practices constitutes a constraint to reducing corruption and improving service delivery. 
Those who know how to report corruption are significantly less likely to have to pay a bribe, to be more 
satisfied with service delivery, and to perceive greater improvements in education and health over time. In 
each of the cases, the point estimate of the coefficients is large, suggesting that improving households’ 
ability to take action against arbitrary behavior by bureaucrats is likely to improve the effectiveness of the 
institutions that have been established to this end and at the same time increase incentives for effective 
provision of public services.  
4.1 Knowledge of reporting and incidence of corruption 
We first report results from the instrumental equation for knowledge of reporting procedures (table 6, 
column 1) where the coefficients reported are marginal probabilities. As explained earlier, the predicted 
value is then used as a right hand side variable to help explain whether households were actually subject 
to corruption.  
Results from the first stage equation illustrate that higher levels of education are associated with 
significantly better knowledge on how to report corruption; households whose head has upper primary 
education are 5% more likely to know the processes involved while those with secondary and tertiary 
education are, respectively, 10% and 17% more likely to know. While higher levels of expenditure at the 
village or household level are estimated to have a similar effect, they are of a much lower magnitude: 
according to the estimates, a 10% increase in village level or household consumption would increase the 
mean villager’s level of knowledge by 0.14 or 0.2 percentage points, respectively.
16 This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that, although they are likely to improve knowledge and thus help reduce corruption, 
higher levels of economic development on their own are unlikely to have a large impact on improving 
households’ knowledge on how to deal with corruption. Professionals are more likely (by 5.5%) to be 
aware of mechanisms to report corruption but surprisingly, those with higher levels of assets, proxied by 
ownership of a permanent house and a bicycle, are not. The fact that female headed households are 
significantly less likely to know how to report corruption could make them more vulnerable to such 
practice. Finally, there are marked differences in knowledge across regions; holding constant for other 
factors, knowledge seems actually to be lower in the country’s central region than in others.  
Results from probit regressions of the likelihood that households who were in contact with specific 
institutions during the last 6 months had to pay a bribe are reported in column 2 for the aggregate and 
column 3-7 of table 6 for individual sectors. Regressions for being affected by corruption overall point 
towards the importance of knowledge; according to the point estimate knowing how to address corruption 
                                                 
16 Due to space considerations, the results with mean levels of village expenditure are not reported but can be obtained from the authors upon 
request.    14
reduces the probability of being subject to bribe-taking by about 25%. Consistent with what one would 
expect and what emerged from the descriptive statistics, affluent households are significantly more likely 
to be forced to pay bribes even though wealth also increases the level of knowledge on how to report; 
ownership of a bicycle increases the probability of being subjected to bribery by almost 3% and higher 
levels of consumption imply a further increase. Female headed households, in turn, are estimated to be 
11% less likely to have to pay bribes, more than compensating for their being less well informed. 
Surprisingly, we also find that once other factors are accounted for, business people and professionals are 
significantly less likely (by 2% and 4%) to be forced to pay bribes than farmers (the excluded category) 
and that rural dwellers are significantly more likely to be subject to demands for bribes. This is consistent 
with evidence that often arbitrarily imposed controls constitute an important impediment for the 
development of Uganda’s agricultural and rural sector (Ellis and Bahiigwa 2003).  
This general pattern is supported by regressions for individual sectors: Knowing how to report corruption 
is estimated to significantly reduce the likelihood of being subject to bribery in all sectors except 
education. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient is largest (-0.93) for the police followed by 
productive services (-0.79), administration (-0.35) and health (-0.31), implying that for the police, 
knowledge of how to report - and presumably the ability to convincingly threaten such reporting to the 
officer demanding bribes - can almost eliminate bribe-taking. Concerning other variables, the regressions 
suggest that the police and productive services are more likely to demand bribes from those with higher 
levels of wealth and less from female-headed households, we also note that bribery by the police and for 
productive services is significantly higher in the rural than in the urban sector and (at least in the case of 
the police) lower for these in the business sector. However, the much smaller magnitude of all these 
coefficients as compared to that for predicted knowledge suggests that greater procedural knowledge is 
likely to be a key element in any efforts to reduce the incidence of bribe-taking.  
4.2 Satisfaction with and improvements in service delivery 
In view of the sample selection problem discussed earlier,
17 we complement evidence on bribe payments 
by those who actually contacted officials in different sectors with factors affecting the level of satisfaction 
with the quality of services provided in each of these sectors.
18 We find that, especially in education, the 
selectivity problem seems indeed to have been an issue -contrary to the earlier regression, the coefficient 
on predicted knowledge is not only highly significant and positive but also of considerable magnitude, 
implying that those who know reporting procedures are 23% more likely to be highly satisfied with 
services in the education sector (Table 7). While the magnitude of coefficients is smaller for other sectors 
(from 0.196 in administrative services, 0.171 in productive services, 0.083 in health and 0.048 for the 
                                                 
17 Note that the problem can go both ways: Households may not contact officials because they are satisfied with the services they receive, i.e. 
there is no reason for doing so, or because they do not expect that doing so will result in any improvement.  
18 Doing so eliminates the selectivity problem but may provide less accurate information.    15
police), all of them are consistently positive, suggesting that greater knowledge of reporting makes it 
more likely to receive high quality services, particularly because households’ knowledge of how to report 
corruption or other misbehavior is expected to change the incentive structure for local bureaucrats. The 
level of corruption in the village is negative for education and health, though insignificant for the 
remainder, and the level of village expenditure positive and significant for education and marginally 
significant for health and productive services. The magnitude of the coefficient on predicted knowledge 
suggests that greater accountability can have a major impact on improving the quality of service delivery.  
To ensure that our results do not suffer from bias due to some unobserved information, we complement 
evidence on levels with information on changes over time for education (separately for teaching, 
buildings, and other facilities) and health sectors. Results from doing so, illustrated in table 8, support our 
earlier conclusions in a number of ways. Predicted knowledge about reporting of corruption increases the 
probabilities of households’ reporting improvements in teaching, buildings and education facilities and 
health by 36, 28, 29 and 16% respectively.
19 The level of corruption is estimated to have a negative and 
highly significant impact on teaching, though not on other elements. Village level expenditure is positive 
and highly significant for education but insignificant for health. This suggests that, while improvements 
in education were facilitated by availability of more resources, improvements in the health sector were 
targeted towards poorer rural dwellers. A key reason for this could be the abolition of user fees in the 
health sector in March 2001 as the reference period for improvements asked for in the survey (i.e. 1998-
2002) includes this but not the initiation of the Universal Primary Education program in 1996. This 
suggests that empowering people to hold public officials responsible can indeed have a major impact not 
only on reducing corruption but also on a broader improvement in the quality with which public services 
are delivered. 
This is consistent with contributions to the cross-country literature that have identified effective provision 
of public services as key determinants of growth in addition to pointing out that accountability may well 
have an independent role that goes beyond preventing corruption and improving services. However, 
evidence from within a given country can help to appreciate the potential magnitude of this effect. While 
our estimates should be treated only as a first approximation that needs to be confirmed by evidence from 
other sources, they certainly suggest that, at least in the case of Uganda, a move to increase the ability of 
citizens to hold their (elected and unelected) representatives to account for their actions can be justified on 
economic grounds as well.  
 
5. Conclusion and policy implications 
                                                 
19 Although improvements in teaching, buildings, and facilities, are highly correlated, the correlation between improvements in health and 
education is only about 0.05.    16
While cross-country evidence on incidence of bribery and corruption and their far-reaching economic 
impact has drawn attention to the importance of governance, micro data at the country level are required 
to help identify strategies that can assist in confronting this issue in practice. This paper constitutes a first 
attempt at doing so, thereby illustrating not only that it is possible to design survey instruments that 
capture key elements of the issue, but also that doing so can yield insights and avenues for policy action.  
We find that, even in a country such as Uganda that has traditionally been applauded in the area of its 
macro-economic policies, issues of governance and corruption remain a serious concern. Households’ 
exposure to bribery is widespread, though differentiated across institutions. Knowledge on ways to 
confront corruption is limited, and satisfaction with the quality of public service provision is low. 
Representatives from private and public sectors have an almost unanimous low opinion concerning the 
integrity of many public institutions -especially those responsible for law enforcement. Respondents point 
toward independent institutions (including the IGG, churches, and local councils), together with a more 
open dialogue promoted by radio, newspapers, and television, as important avenues to reduce bribery and 
corruption.  
Even though many households experienced corruption first-hand, lack of knowledge on appropriate 
procedures is an important constraint to reporting such misbehavior, which is a necessary pre-condition 
for action by the institutions established for this purpose. Econometric analysis confirms that households’ 
knowledge on reporting corruption is indeed a key factor in reducing their susceptibility to being asked to 
pay bribes and, in addition, has a positive impact on the level of (as well as changes in) the quality with 
which public services are being provided. Knowledge on mechanisms to report is a key ingredient not 
only toward resisting the tendency of government bureaucrats to use the power bestowed on them for 
individual gain. The fact that households’ knowledge about how to report corruption can be demonstrated 
to be a key element in improving the delivery of public services could imply that, by providing 
mechanisms to better articulate their opinions and increasing civic responsibility (and ability to resist 
unjustified claims), measures to increase public debate and transparency can have benefits beyond the 
original goal of reducing the incidence of corruption. Further exploration of this link, as well as potential 
mechanisms that might underlie it, would be of great interest not only for Uganda but also for other 
countries that share similar cultural, political, and socio-economic characteristics.  
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Table 1: Perceptions of bribery in different institutions, Uganda by private and public sector (percentages) 
  Sector of respondent  Overall  
 Private  Public   
Low level of corruption      
Central  Bank  3.26 3.72 3.46 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  3.77  4.84  4.24 
Office of Ethics and Integrity  4.12  5.21  4.60 
Ministry  of  Labor  5.49 7.64 6.43 
National water and sewerage  corporation  6.69 7.64 7.11 
Prisons  8.58 8.75 8.65 
Ministry of Finance  8.23  13.04  10.33 
Ministry of Works  8.58  15.08  11.42 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry  13.55  9.12  11.61 
Administrator General's office  14.07  11.17  12.80 
Ministry of Public Service  17.67  13.22  15.72 
Ministry  of  Education  19.73 14.9 17.62 
DPP 17.32  18.25  17.73 
Parliament 15.78  23.46  19.14 
Private companies  21.27  16.57  19.22 
State House/President’s Office  21.78  17.69  19.99 
Medium level of corruption      
IGG's office  25.56  13.59  20.33 
LC 1  22.3  18.62  20.69 
Sub-county Councils  20.58  25.14  22.57 
NSSF 30.53  16.95  24.59 
Local Administration  30.36  20.86  26.21 
Ministry of Health   31.22  25.7  28.81 
District councils  31.39  33.15  32.16 
Privatization Unit  39.97  29.42  35.36 
Immigration Department 45.10  30.78  38.75 
Courts 35.47  43.46  39.02 
High level of corruption      
Ministry of Defense  44.6  36.69  41.14 
Police excluding traffic police  58.66  52.51  55.97 
Electoral  commission  59.69 52.7 56.63 
Tender boards  59.52  55.12  57.60 
Uganda Revenue Authority  72.38  54.93  64.75 
Traffic police  73.76  64.99  69.93 
No. of observations  618  480  1098 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the Institutional Module of the Uganda Second National Integrity Survey 2002.   18
 
Table 2: Assessment of the prevalence of different forms of corruption according to the private and public sector  
  Favoritism (%)  Bribery (%)  Embezzlement (%) Fraud (%)  Extortion (%)  Obs. 
  Prev. Com. Prev. Com. Prev. Com. Prev. Com. Prev. Com.   
Single  proprietor 67.8 13.8 53.9 25.7 54.6 27.0 26.3 28.3 17.1 21.7  152 
Partnership  59.8 20.1 56.7 22.6 61.0 20.7 28.7 31.7 17.7 26.8  164 
Foreign  corporation  66.7 17.6 68.6 21.6 51.0 31.4 29.4 25.5 13.7 37.3 51 
Local company
1  73.6 13.9 69.9 17.6 58.3 25.5 31.9 27.8 20.4 28.7  251 
All private sector  67.6 16.0 61.9 21.4 57.5 25.0 29.3 28.8 18.2 27.1  618 
All public sector  52.1 21.5 34.8 33.4 39.8 30.4 25.8 28.2 14.5 23.3  480 
Total  60.8 18.4 50.1 26.6 49.8 27.4 27.8 28.5 16.6 25.4  1098
1 Includes others; Pre. = prevalent; Com. = Common. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the Institutional Module of the Uganda Second National Integrity Survey 2002. 
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Table 3: Household characteristics  
  All  Expenditure quintiles  
  Uganda  1 2 3 4 5 
Female head (%)  14.99  19.57 13.46 14.70 13.08 14.12 
Age  of  head  (years)  36.68 37.77 35.01 35.28 35.65 39.69 
Household size  5.70  4.56 4.95 5.50 5.99 7.51 
Education of head (%)        
None  9.04  17.28  8.78 7.52 6.64 4.93 
Primary  1-4  12.09 17.86 14.82 11.79  9.59  6.36 
Primary  5-7  30.03 34.98 36.00 32.57 26.98 19.58 
Secondary 36.29  25.19  32.51 36.14 42.76 44.91 
Tertiary 11.78  3.71  7.39  11.05 13.57 23.23 
Occupation of head (%)        
Farmer  32.14 49.00 37.32 29.16 24.15 20.98 
Trader  21.15 14.39 18.10 21.48 26.04 25.78 
Professional 15.33  6.11  11.08 14.91 18.04 26.56 
Craftsperson  16.78 17.73 20.57 18.81 15.79 11.00 
Student/other  4.18 4.16 3.78 4.23 4.31 4.43 
Ownership of assets (%)     
Bicycle/cycle/car 49.24  37.49 45.65 48.42 54.78 59.93 
Permanent  house  38.11 21.31 30.09 38.15 44.32 56.81 
Rural  household  58.84 72.94 66.30 57.54 52.93 44.42 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the Second National Integrity Survey 2002 for Uganda.   20
Table 4: Knowledge of mechanisms to report corruption and actual reporting 
  All   Expenditure quintile  
  Uganda 1 2 3 4 5 
1. USE OF SERVICES AND INCIDENCE OF BRIBERY        
Used public service 6 months before survey (%)        
Education (%)  43.62  24.90 34.36 42.63 52.15 64.20 
Health  (%)  65.96 53.34 64.53 68.05 71.22 72.74 
Police  (%)  22.22 11.04 16.79 21.48 28.13 33.74 
Administration (%)  39.58  30.93 36.41 39.06 43.26 48.32 
Productive services (%)  22.04 11.37 15.93 22.26 25.99 36.78 
Share of users being subjected to payment of bribes (%)        
Health    20.91 19.79 21.63 20.52 20.44 21.95 
Education   7.03  4.75 7.41 6.55 7.08 7.99 
Administration   14.70  11.86 12.51 15.04 16.21 16.57 
Productive services   26.18 21.51 24.48 23.80 26.97 28.46 
Police    36.11 31.37 34.96 36.71 37.03 37.10 
Amount of bribe paid (Median, Ushs)        
Health    4,000 2,000 3,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 
Education   5,000  2,000 2,500 3,000 5,000 6,000 
Administration   3,000  2,050 3,000 3,000 3,000 4,000 
Productive services   10,000 5,000  5,000 10,000 9,000 14,000 
Police   15,000  10,000  10,000 15,000 18,000 20,000 
2. SATISFACTION WITH SERVICE PROVISION        
Highly satisfied with service (%)        
Health  7.63 4.97 5.79 7.72 9.39  10.30 
Education  6.81 3.42 4.64 5.83 8.28  11.90 
Police  1.80 0.82 1.07 1.23 2.46 3.41 
Administration  7.22 4.77 5.99 6.49 8.65  10.22 
Service  3.30 1.59 1.77 3.04 3.69 6.40 
Satisfied with service (%)        
Health  38.59 33.25 36.86 39.26 41.90 41.71 
Education  29.13 16.71 23.07 29.08 34.89 42.00 
Police  9.44 4.20 6.12 9.20  12.14  15.60 
Administration  24.57 19.60 23.44 23.90 26.45 29.52 
Service 12.68  5.99  8.13  12.36  15.09  21.88 
Changes in quality of service during last 4 years (%)        
Health improved significantly  8.45 7.05 6.65 8.54 9.47  10.55 
Health improved somewhat  48.05 40.10 46.10 49.40 51.70 53.00 
Teaching improved significantly  10.43  5.38 5.87 9.40  12.46  19.05 
Teaching improved somewhat  44.38 32.48 36.21 43.08 48.34 61.86 
School buildings improved significantly  17.02 10.88 11.70 16.22 19.93 26.44 
School buildings improved somewhat  51.99 39.73 43.47 52.07 56.01 68.76 
Education facilities improved significantly 12.07  7.54  8.05 11.62  13.94  19.21 
Education facilities improved somewhat 48.18  36.80  39.66 47.56 52.36 64.61 
3. KNOWLEDGE OF CORRUPTION AND REPORTING        
Knowledge and of reporting of corruption (%)        
Affected  by  bribery  28.04 18.87 25.94 27.89 31.41 36.17 
Ever  reported  corruption  case    4.48 1.20 3.86 4.40 4.39 7.76 
Knew of corruption cases but did not  report    40.45 28.16 36.50 41.63 46.26 49.87 
  Did not know where to report   39.79  41.61  41.26  39.93  38.97  38.22 
  Did not want to offend other  people    18.85 19.46 20.33 19.81 18.99 16.45 
  Avoided the bother   13.48  13.77  12.76  12.21  15.13  13.37 
  Other reason   27.88  25.16 25.65 28.05 26.91 31.96 
Knows reporting procedures   20.63 13.45 18.31 20.49 22.63 27.75 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the Second National Integrity Survey 2002 for Uganda. 
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Table 5: Institutions/organizations that help in reducing corruption 
  All Uganda  Central  East  North  West 
High impact (%)          
Radio 49.27  54.67  43.56  21.19  58.41 
Presidents' Office/State House 44.19  45.70  40.81  13.21  62.14 
IGG’ Office  34.81  33.62  29.70  22.74  50.04 
Commissions of enquiry 34.67  39.69  25.09  12.78  45.07 
Newspapers 33.46  37.63 29.66  15.68  37.61 
Church organizations  27.59  29.52  34.59  22.39  18.77 
Local Councils  23.63  24.31  25.78  15.04  24.81 
Medium impact (%)          
Ministry of Ethics and Integrity 19.20  18.32  13.86  3.11  36.25 
Television 18.73  22.02 19.35 6.00  17.52 
General public  18.66  18.97 25.13  12.50  14.87 
Members of Parliament 16.69  16.95  17.90  9.39  19.10 
Local politicians  16.16  16.61  17.54  11.09  16.65 
Human rights groups  14.28 16.81  16.73  7.20  9.73 
Teachers 13.30  13.74 15.64 9.53  12.01 
Judiciary 13.19  14.05  12.73  9.75  13.59 
Women's organizations  12.70 12.98  17.01  5.72  11.68 
Non-governmental organisations 12.64  13.94  17.17  7.42  7.87 
Auditor General  11.72  12.54  11.96  7.49  11.97 
Little impact (%)          
Police 8.98  9.77  9.90  6.99  7.29 
Universities 8.29  8.75  10.06  4.45  7.58 
National Bureau of Standards  7.00  7.14  9.78  3.88  5.63 
Professional bodies  6.80 6.63  9.17  2.33  7.42 
Observations 12,200  5,895 2,475  1,416  2,414 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the Second National Integrity Survey 2002 for Uganda.   22
 
Table 6: Determinants and impact of knowledge on reporting corruption   
  Knowledge  Household subject to corruption with respect to 
  on reporting  Overall  Health  Education  Police  Administrative  prod. services 
Predicted     -0.265**  -0.311** 0.075  -0.925***  -0.353*** -0.787*** 
  knowldege    (2.40)  (2.53)  (0.84)  (3.79)  (2.58)  (3.64) 
Consumption exp.   0.022***  0.064*** 0.018***  0.006  0.056***  0.027***  0.050*** 
  (log)  (6.72)  (13.57)  (3.45)  (1.53)  (5.15)  (4.54)  (5.39) 
Female head  -0.061***  -0.113***  -0.077*** 0.002 -0.161*** -0.037**  -0.075** 
 (5.73)  (8.31)  (5.20)  (0.17)  (4.64)  (1.98)  (2.37) 
Permanent house  -0.009  -0.014  0.005 -0.013* 0.005  -0.022*  0.014 
 (1.09)  (1.45)  (0.49)  (1.70)  (0.23)  (1.88)  (0.75) 
Owns a bicycle  0.008  0.028***  0.006 0.004 -0.004 0.022** 0.057*** 
 (1.11)  (3.20)  (0.63)  (0.59)  (0.20)  (2.04)  (3.28) 
Business -0.006  -0.024**  -0.023* -0.025***  -0.055**  -0.006  0.001 
 (0.60)  (2.02)  (1.74)  (2.65)  (2.24)  (0.39)  (0.05) 
Professional 0.055***  -0.043**  -0.010 -0.026** -0.058  0.009  0.007 
 (4.33)  (2.50)  (0.54)  (2.03)  (1.54)  (0.41)  (0.21) 
Rural -0.022***  0.022**  0.007  -0.001 0.049**  0.007  0.049** 
 (2.68)  (2.30)  (0.66)  (0.13)  (2.31)  (0.61)  (2.50) 
East 0.036***  0.114***  0.095***  0.009 0.120***  0.043***  0.129*** 
 (3.52)  (9.33)  (7.19)  (0.90)  (4.33)  (2.78)  (5.40) 
North 0.048***  0.031**  0.093***  -0.021 -0.004  0.047**  -0.022 
 (3.69)  (2.07)  (5.31)  (1.62)  (0.09)  (2.13)  (0.71) 
West 0.096***  -0.007  -0.042** -0.028** 0.198***  0.072***  0.032 
 (9.21)  (0.44)  (2.46)  (2.33)  (5.52)  (3.51)  (0.92) 
Lower primary  0.028             
 (1.48)             
Upper primary  0.054***             
 (3.24)             
Secondary 0.103***             
 (6.14)             
Tertiary 0.177***             
 (7.90)             
Observations 11,888  11,888 7,855  5,204  2,664  4,717  2695 
Log likelihood rat.  -5,772.49 -6,780.85 -3,932.70 -1,306.37 -1,688.90  -1,954.05  -1484.87 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 7: Determinants of satisfaction with service delivery 
  High satisfaction with services provided by 
 Education  Health  Police  Administration Productive  services 
Predicted knowledge  0.227*** 0.083*** 0.048*** 0.196***  0.171*** 
  (8.10) (2.62) (3.26) (6.33)  (8.92) 
Mean corruption in village  -0.073***  -0.046**  -0.013  -0.011  0.008 
  (4.06) (2.40) (1.32) (0.59)  (0.65) 
Village expenditure (log)  0.012***  0.008*  0.002  -0.001  0.006* 
  (2.81) (1.73) (0.85) (0.15)  (1.95) 
Rural 0.005  -0.002  -0.003  0.019***  0.007** 
  (1.06) (0.37) (1.08) (3.47)  (1.99) 
East Dummy   -0.022***  -0.033***  -0.009***  -0.039***  -0.010** 
  (3.49) (4.99) (2.77) (6.43)  (2.47) 
North  Dummy  -0.032*** -0.034*** -0.010*** -0.041***  -0.016*** 
  (4.58) (4.44) (2.72) (5.92)  (3.51) 
West Dummy   0.021***  0.020*** -0.002 -0.023***  -0.008* 
  (3.30) (2.86) (0.71) (3.63)  (1.88) 
Observations  11,888 11,888 11,888 11,888  11888 
Log likelihood ratio  -2,845.26  -3,161.29 -1,047.38 -3,045.92  -1672.77 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8: Impact of knowledge and corruption on changes in quality of service delivery 
  Significant improvement in .. 
 Teaching  Buildings  Facilities  Health   
Predicted knowledge on reporting  0.357*** 0.278*** 0.286*** 0.157*** 
  (6.68) (4.13) (4.88) (3.54) 
Mean overall corruption in village  -0.103***  0.023  0.007  -0.028 
  (3.12) (0.61) (0.20) (1.10) 
Village-level expenditure (log)  0.043***  0.047***  0.033***  0.006 
  (5.52) (4.86) (3.92) (0.87) 
Rural -0.028***  -0.004  -0.003  0.018** 
  (2.89) (0.37) (0.26) (2.32) 
East -0.056***  0.026*  -0.016  -0.015* 
  (5.10) (1.88) (1.34) (1.74) 
North  -0.106*** -0.098*** -0.117*** -0.057*** 
  (8.43) (6.05) (8.46) (5.54) 
West -0.004  -0.033**  -0.018  -0.015 
  (0.36) (2.20) (1.37) (1.58) 
Observations  7,620 7,620 7,620 9,018 
Log likelihood ratio  -3,238.22  -4,350.84 -3,614.35 -3,132.85 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   25
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